Industry solutions
Automotive
An ASIL is a budget, not a label.
Automotive functional safety runs from concept HARA to start of production at platform speed: safety goals decomposed across domains and suppliers, hardware metrics proven against ASIL targets, DFMEAs kept live through every model-year change. RAMSynapse keeps that chain on one system model — from the first hazardous event to field returns.
ASIL evidence scatters across the supply chain
The OEM sets safety goals; Tier-1s return FMEDAs, DFMEAs and fault trees in different tools and formats — rolling up PMHF at vehicle level becomes a manual exercise.
Model-year churn outruns the analyses
Platform variants and yearly refreshes invalidate every number that was retyped instead of linked — the DFMEA ages faster than anyone can revise it.
The assessor wants the work products connected
An ISO 26262 functional safety assessment asks for the path from hazardous event to safety goal to verification — reconstructing it by hand costs the programme weeks before every milestone.
The regulatory landscape
The standards, and the modules that carry them.
ISO 26262
Road Vehicles — Functional Safety
HARA, ASIL determination and decomposition, then proof: single-point fault metric, latent fault metric and PMHF quantified against the ASIL target for every safety goal.
ISO 21448
Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF)
Hazards from performance insufficiencies and foreseeable misuse — no component has to fail. Scenario-driven hazard work that runs alongside the ISO 26262 case, not inside it.
AIAG-VDA FMEA Handbook
Design & Process FMEA
The harmonised seven-step method with failure networks and Action Priority in place of RPN — the FMEA structure OEM audits now expect to see.
IATF 16949
Automotive Quality Management
Mandates FMEA as a core tool and closed-loop problem solving on field returns — the quality-system frame the RAMS evidence has to live inside.
A platform-typical chain
One model, every analysis.
How an automotive programme runs the functional-safety case on one system model — each result feeding the next analysis live, never retyped.
- Run the HARAFHAHazardous events rated for severity, exposure and controllability; an ASIL and a safety goal fall out of every one — the top of the whole evidence chain.
- Decompose the ASIL budgetsAllocationPMHF and hardware-metric targets allocated down the architecture to ECUs and items — every supplier sees exactly the share of the budget they carry.
- Build the DFMEA per AIAG-VDAFMECASeven steps, failure networks, Action Priority — with failure modes inheriting real rates from the same model the safety analyses use.
- Prove the safety goals by fault treeFault TreeOne tree per safety-goal violation, quantified from the shared failure rates — PMHF against the ASIL target, single-point faults surfaced before the assessor finds them.
- Feed the field backFRACASWarranty and field failures flow through FRACAS; observed rates recalibrate the metrics and re-age the safety case honestly, model year after model year.
Bring the assessor a connected safety case.
See how an automotive programme runs HARA, ASIL decomposition, DFMEA, fault trees and field feedback on one shared system model — on your own infrastructure.