Industry solutions
Nuclear
Defence in depth, demonstrated.
Nuclear licensing does not accept assertions — every safety-important system carries a demonstrated reliability, every barrier a quantified claim, every corrective action a closed record. RAMSynapse keeps that demonstration alive across a plant lifetime measured in decades, not document revisions.
The safety case outlives its authors
Plants run for sixty years through refits, I&C replacements and licence renewals — analyses frozen in decades-old documents cannot answer today's regulator.
Regulators want the full pedigree
Under 10 CFR 50 Appendix B every safety-related number needs a traceable origin and a controlled change history — reconstructing that from disconnected files consumes outages of effort.
Operating experience moves faster than paper
OPEX reports, plant events and component failures arrive continuously, but without a live feedback loop they never reach the fault trees and FMECAs that should absorb them.
The regulatory landscape
The standards, and the modules that carry them.
IEC 61513
NPP Instrumentation & Control Important to Safety — General Requirements
The overall-architecture standard for nuclear I&C: safety functions assigned to systems with demonstrated reliability, independence and defence in depth, consistent with IAEA safety guidance.
IEC 61226
Classification of I&C Functions
Categorises instrumentation and control functions by their importance to safety — the classification that decides how much rigour, redundancy and reliability each function must carry.
IEC 60880
Software for Category A Functions
Software requirements for computer-based systems performing the highest safety-category functions — where systematic failure analysis meets the hardware reliability case.
10 CFR 50 Appendix B
Quality Assurance Criteria (US NRC)
The US quality-assurance criteria for nuclear plants: design control, document control and — critically for RAMS — corrective action that provably closes the loop on every identified failure.
A plant-typical chain
One model, every analysis.
How a nuclear programme keeps the reliability demonstration connected — from hazard identification through PSA-style quantification to the operating-experience loop the regulator expects to see working.
- Work the hazards, barrier by barrierFHAIdentify the functions important to safety and the postulated events that challenge each level of defence in depth — the frame every downstream analysis hangs on.
- FMECA the safety-important systemsFMECAFailure modes across I&C channels and mechanical trains inherit their rates from one source; single-failure vulnerabilities surface instead of hiding in appendices.
- Quantify fault trees, PSA-styleFault TreeSystem unavailability per safety function, with minimal cut sets and common-cause groups — the numbers the probabilistic safety assessment builds on, always current with the design.
- Hold the maintainability and spares lineMaintainabilityRepair times, test intervals and spares levels analysed against allowed outage times — so surveillance and maintenance strategy rest on evidence, not habit.
- Close the operating-experience loopFRACASPlant events and component failures flow back through FRACAS; Weibull fits on operating data recalibrate the trees, and corrective action closes traceably per Appendix B.
Keep the demonstration alive for sixty years.
See how a nuclear programme runs hazard analysis, FMECA, fault-tree quantification, maintainability and the operating-experience loop on one shared system model — on your own infrastructure.