Industry solutions
Space Systems
Single-point failures are found on the ground, or never.
A spacecraft that fails in orbit stays failed — reliability is fixed at lift-off. Space programmes answer with discipline on the ground: derated parts, FMECAs that hunt single-point failures, fault trees that close every feared event before the review board convenes. RAMSynapse keeps those analyses consistent on one model of the spacecraft.
No maintenance plan can save the design
There is no repair after launch — every reliability and safety claim has to be designed in, analysed and proven before the spacecraft leaves the cleanroom.
Single-point failures hide between analyses
The SPF list is only as good as the FMECA behind it — when failure modes, retention rationales and design changes live in separate documents, the list quietly goes stale.
Review boards read for consistency
PDR, CDR and QR data packages quote reliability figures, derating results and criticality rankings — one mismatch between them costs a review cycle and the board's confidence.
The regulatory landscape
The standards, and the modules that carry them.
ECSS-Q-ST-30
Space Product Assurance — Dependability
The ESA dependability programme: reliability, availability and maintainability analyses planned, performed and kept current through the project life cycle.
ECSS-Q-ST-40
Space Product Assurance — Safety
Hazard analysis and safety risk control for space systems — catastrophic and critical consequences identified, reduced and verified closed before flight.
ECSS-Q-ST-30-02
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis
The FMEA/FMECA discipline for space: severity categories, criticality ranking, and the single-point-failure list every review board reads first.
ECSS-Q-ST-30-11
Derating — EEE Components
Load and stress limits per part family — every EEE component verified against its derating rule, with deviations justified part by part.
NASA-STD-8729.1
Reliability and Maintainability for Spaceflight Systems
NASA's objectives-based R&M standard — activities and evidence structured around mission-success objectives rather than a fixed checklist of analyses.
A mission-typical chain
One model, every analysis.
How a spacecraft programme carries the dependability and safety case from part stress to flight — one model, every number in the review data package traceable to its source.
- Derate every EEE partDeratingEach component checked against its ECSS-Q-ST-30-11 stress limits — the applied-stress data captured once, per part, ready to drive the predictions.
- Predict unit reliabilityPredictionPart-stress predictions reuse the same stress ratios the derating analysis recorded — unit failure rates roll up to the mission reliability figure the board will quote.
- Run the ECSS FMECAFMECAFailure modes per ECSS-Q-ST-30-02 inherit the predicted rates; single-point failures flag themselves, and every retention carries its rationale on the record.
- Close the feared eventsFault TreeFault trees for catastrophic and critical events per ECSS-Q-ST-40, quantified with the same failure rates the FMECA uses — closure evidence ready for qualification review.
- Learn from AIT and flightFRACASTest anomalies during integration and in-orbit observations flow back through FRACAS — the next mission starts from evidence, not assumptions.
Arrive at the review board with one consistent story.
See how a space programme runs derating, prediction, FMECA and fault trees on one shared model of the spacecraft — on your own infrastructure.